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Modern View
STRATEGIC DEMANDS
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
120052
Research on Indian ocean region
/ Wang, Rong; Wan, Guanghua
2012
Wan, Guanghua
Book
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Edition
vol. 2012/2
Publication
Beijing, Social Science Academic Press, 2012.
Description
191p.pbk
Standard Number
9787509735381
Key Words
FDI
;
China
;
Myanmar
;
Indian Ocean Region
;
Strategic Demands
;
Sino - India Relation
;
Sino - India Economic Growth
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Policy
Location
057212
320.91824/WAN 057212
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2
ID:
095379
Strategic demands, credible threats, and economic coercion outc
/ Krustev, Valentin L
Krustev, Valentin L
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2010.
Summary/Abstract
The crisis bargaining literature sees demands as endogenous to crises. However, despite the parallels between military and economic coercion, sanctions researchers have preferred to analyze economic coercion after demands have been issued, and have not explored sufficiently the possibility that when senders formulate their policy objectives, they consider the international constraints imposed by the capabilities and interests of target states. I complement the sanctions literature by deriving the implications of strategic goal formulation in a game theoretic model of economic coercion that assumes endogenous demands. The model explains the inconsistent empirical relationship between sanctions costs and outcomes as well as the paradoxical tendency of senders to select into difficult disputes. I find that threats are not always more effective than sanctions and suggest what an optimal sanctions policy might look like.
Key Words
Equilibrium
;
Strategic Demands
;
Credible Threats
;
Economic Coercion
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