Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
114866
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The prevailing explanation of the institutionalization of the principles of war is misleading. Although the introduction of the principles into Western doctrine coincided with total war and the need to train unprecedented numbers of soldiers and junior officers in tactics, the fact that the principles disappeared from doctrines immediately prior to and during the Second World War suggests that they were not institutionalized to meet an increased need to educate the military. Instead, we test two other explanations: one drawing on the principles' military effectiveness and one drawing upon the principles' explanatory power. We find that neither one of these hypotheses stand. Instead, we conclude by elaborating on how the institutionalization of the principles of war can be made understandable using non-rationalist frameworks, in particular the growth of a particular kind of identity of staff officers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. According to this framework, the two world wars interrupted-rather than promoted-the institutionalization of the principles, since the wars with their large death tolls and mass recruitment increased the difficulties of creating a separate and unique identity for the burgeoning corps of staff officers.
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2 |
ID:
072583
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3 |
ID:
131220
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4 |
ID:
087918
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The infamous US raid in Mogadishu was a turning point in the Somali civil war. Although the special forces involved sought to observe the principles of war, the entanglement of the mission indicates a profound violation of those principles. Without effective intelligence and appropriate equipment, the task force embarked on an assault that disregarded the crucial elements of surprise and the achievement of relative superiority.
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5 |
ID:
082146
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
This study develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and the associated principles. First, the concept of fourth generation operations is introduced and defined. Fourth generation operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the global war on terrorism. Based on the framework of US joint doctrine, the supporting principles of fourth generation operations are developed. This requires the introduction of the principle of Population Perception.
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6 |
ID:
079058
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7 |
ID:
142184
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Publication |
New Delhi, Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2016.
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Description |
xvi, 188p.: maps, ill.hbk
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Standard Number |
9788170623120
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058405 | 355.0254095491/PUR 058405 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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8 |
ID:
143034
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Publication |
New Delhi, Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2016.
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Description |
xvi, 188p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9788170623120
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058430 | 355.0254095491/PUR 058430 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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9 |
ID:
079052
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10 |
ID:
073425
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11 |
ID:
064357
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12 |
ID:
069136
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13 |
ID:
116065
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for "universal principles of war," a second, "context-dependent," approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a "paradoxical logic" school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a "dominate-mix" approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.
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14 |
ID:
015345
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Publication |
Oct-Dec 1992.
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Description |
447-461
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15 |
ID:
139502
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Summary/Abstract |
Strategic debates have long characterized the discourse on military affairs. Three lively disputes concern: 1) Whether set “principles of war” can be codified and mastered; 2) The relative strengths and limitations of maritime and continental power; and 3) The potential for waging successful “short wars.” Carl von Clausewitz provided the sharpest critique of the principles of war, arguing that “friction” can overwhelm even highly refined military art. A.T. Mahan's concept of sea power was challenged by Halford Mackinder's theory of “heartland power.” Short-war notions animated by Moltke the Elder's victories in the 19th Century German wars of unification, and expanded upon by his successors, were rebutted by Ivan Bloch. Each debate remains relevant: technological advances prompt reappraisal of principles of war; the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia as great continental powers challenge American naval mastery; and insurgents and terrorists continue to prove the value of “long wars.”
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