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| 1 |
ID:
166078
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| Summary/Abstract |
Speed. Since nations first went to war, speed has been a key factor in combat, particularly at the very onset of battle. The rapid concentration and employment of force can help a belligerent overpower an opponent and avoid a costly war of attrition, an approach that underlaid Germany’s blitzkrieg (lightning war) strategy during World War II and America's “shock and awe” campaign against Iraq in 2003.
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| 2 |
ID:
185790
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| 3 |
ID:
143302
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.
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| 4 |
ID:
162613
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| Publication |
Singapore, Springer Nature, 2019.
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| Description |
xx, 234p.hbk
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| Series |
Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies; 132
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| Standard Number |
9789811333835
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059560 | 623.45/LEL 059560 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
194369
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| Summary/Abstract |
Assessing the utility of hypersonic boost glide vehicles (BGVs) requires comparing their capabilities to alternative systems that could carry out the same missions, particularly given the technical difficulties and additional costs of developing BGVs compared to more established technologies. This paper discusses the primary motivations given for BGVs—most notably countering missile defenses—and summarizes current hypersonic development programs. It finds that evading the most capable current endo-atmospheric defenses requires that BGVs maintain speeds significantly higher than Mach 5 throughout their glide phase, which has implications for their mass and range. The paper then compares BGVs to maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) carried on ballistic missiles flown on depressed trajectories and shows that MaRVs can offer significant advantages over BGVs in a wide range of cases. Finally, the paper shows that BGV maneuvering during its glide phase can result in substantial costs in range and glide speed.
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| 6 |
ID:
192456
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN RECENT years, hypersonic weapons have become a central topic of discussion around new military technologies affecting international security. Hypersonics are becoming apriority area of military-technological development that some states are using to restore their strategic stability and provide a real deterrence mechanism and others are using to pursue the goal of global dominance. Vast financial, scientific, and technical resources are being invested in the development of missile programs.
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| 7 |
ID:
156720
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| Publication |
New Delhi, IDSA, 2017.
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| Description |
47p.pbk
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| Series |
IDSA Occasional Paper no. 46
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| Standard Number |
9789382169765
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059236 | 629.1320954/LEL 059236 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 059237 | 629.1320954/LEL 059237 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
188357
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study explores the relationships between hypersonic weapons and nuclear deterrence. This relationship is fraught with uncertainty because the velocity of innovation in hypersonics is difficult to forecast. Nevertheless, major nuclear powers are developing hypersonic weapons, including some that can be deployed on intercontinental launchers. Hypersonic glide vehicles or cruise missiles could threaten first strike stability by reducing the time for responsive decision making in the face of perceived threats, or by evading antimissile defenses otherwise competent to deflect attacks. Attacks on space based assets and cyberattacks, combined with hypersonic missiles, could pose unacceptable risks to assured retaliation based on an assumed number of survivable launch platforms. On the other hand, analysis suggests that, in the case of the United States and Russia, going forward, strategic nuclear deterrents with currently projected modernization plans should suffice to maintain deterrence and first strike stability, barring unforeseen developments in breakthrough technologies.
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| 9 |
ID:
167309
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| Summary/Abstract |
If targeted by hypersonic weapons, Russia or China might conclude that its strategic nuclear forces were under attack when they were not.
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| 10 |
ID:
194177
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyses Russia’s approach to strategic arms control with a particular focus on two central yet largely paradoxical principles: strategic stability and asymmetry. A rise in asymmetries in the capabilities of the United States and the Russian Federation, global shifts in power, and a proceeding deterioration of U.S.–Russia relations have marked the post-Cold War era, challenging traditional arms control regimes based on strategic stability understood in terms of parity in the nuclear arsenals of the two most potent nuclear powers. Somewhat counterintuitively, the developments in the military-technological sphere that undermine the very principle of parity concurrently incentivise Russia to invest in asymmetric solutions to counterbalance these tendencies and maintain strategic stability. By analysing the views of Russian military experts, the article takes a look at the INF Treaty, New START and hypersonic weapons to examine the past, present and future challenges to the U.S.–Russian arms control architecture. It arrives at the conclusion that Russia’s home-grown solution to its security conundrum is a perplexing mix of a desire for strategic stability-cum-parity in strategic arms control and a pragmatic emphasis on asymmetries while it tries to preserve its position, which is symptomatic of the paradoxical nature of strategy itself.
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| 11 |
ID:
181877
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| Summary/Abstract |
This research explores the shape of warfare to come over the next twenty-five years from a Swedish perspective. It is evident that change in the practice of warfare is apparent in international relations today due to the use of innovative new technologies. These developments raise profound practical and conceptual questions for armed forces as to what do these new systems mean for the prosecution of warfare and the intellectual ideas/knowledge base that underpin the contemporary application of force. This research offers a tentative exploration of three aspects (artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms and the future battlefield: the soldier level) framed in the context of the traditional environments of air, land and sea to interrogate their meaning for Sweden and future warfare.
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| 12 |
ID:
183917
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| Publication |
Switzerland, Center for Security Studies, 2022.
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| Description |
115p.pbk
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| Series |
Center for Security Studies
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| Standard Number |
9783905696851
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060160 | 341.2333/CAR 060160 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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