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ID:
178119
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do small states succeed in influencing global policies? Traditional International Relations theories highlight the vulnerability and limited capacity of small states and suggest that the scope for these states to influence global policies is limited. However, recent literature on small states in global governance has challenged this view. Studies have found that in the context of international organizations, participation in coalitions and favourable decision-making structures, among others, contribute to explaining the influence of small states in global governance. While these factors are indeed relevant, they only partly explain how small states are able to influence global policies. Drawing on in-depth qualitative research exploring the influence of small states, this article advances understandings of how small states can influence global governance and international negotiations. Focusing on one small state, the article analyses how Bhutan, through policy entrepreneur Jigme Y. Thinley, challenged fundamental ideas about what constitutes development by placing happiness on the global agenda. We contribute unique data on the influence of Bhutan and an analytical framework on the influence of small states, outlining a process of how small states can influence global policy despite their structural weaknesses. The framework consists of an attribute in the form of policy entrepreneur(s) who speak and act on behalf of the state, four strategies comprising the marketing of the state, venue shopping, facilitating learning and coalition networks, and two framework conditions, including windows of opportunity and a conducive decision-making process.
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| 2 |
ID:
145069
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| Summary/Abstract |
Surprisingly little is known about how government representatives pay attention to the input of nongovernmental organizations in international negotiations. This article presents an analytical framework and illustrates, with findings from the climate change negotiations 2009–2012, the conditions under which government representatives pay attention to the input from transnational advocacy networks like the Climate Action Network. Demonstrations and lobbying attempts on the international level are frequently ignored, given that negotiation mandates with little leeway are agreed on beforehand. This requires a longer-term perspective toward changing government positions for the next round of negotiations following high media attention. Governments value NGO involvement because they grant legitimacy and signal public support. Successful lobbying requires policy entrepreneurial strategies, close networks, and early input on the domestic level.
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