|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
194357
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Many China observers have commented that Beijing is harsh and assertive on diplomatic occasions. By publicizing the nationalistic rhetoric and moves in internal propaganda, the PRC aims to please domestic audiences. This article examines China’s practices of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’, explicates the rationale behind it, and provides three plausible explanations. Firstly, the individualist explanation highlights the personal motives of ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomats. However, wolf-warrior diplomacy is not the common practice of Chinese diplomats, as most Chinese diplomats, unlike these wolf-warriors, remain conservative, taking an orthodox approach to their duties. Secondly, the institutional explanation presents a potential conflict between propaganda and diplomacy agencies in conducting waixuan (external propaganda, overseas-targeted propaganda: 外宣). I elaborate on how the changing working doctrines of waixuan have encouraged wolf-warrior diplomacy. Finally, the strategic explanation highlights how Beijing diverts the popular attention away from its domestic issues and towards ‘external threats’ and rallies popular support at home by ‘talking tough’ and ‘blaming others’. The diversionary use of assertive diplomacy also allows Beijing to avoid publicizing its policy failures, buy more time and room for manoeuvre, and plan tactical reforms while preserving its fundamental political system. I also argue that the wolf-warrior diplomacy is more of ad hoc response to perceived geopolitical risk in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic than a well-crafted strategy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
155934
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Based on quantitative and normative analyses, this article finds that China’s military budget in the post-Mao era benefits from the central government’s advantageous position in national revenue distribution under the 1994 tax-sharing scheme. Memoirs of political and military elites have shown that military needs were actually a major concern for the launch of tax reform, which subsequently facilitated changes in the fund allotment of the People’s Liberation Army from Deng Xiaoping’s “military shall endure” (军队要忍耐 jundui yao rennai) approach, to “self-improving, self-developing” (自我完善 自我发展 ziwo wanshan ziwo fazhan) commercialisation, and to Jiang Zemin’s “eating imperial grain” (吃皇粮 chi huangliang) reform.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
178438
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Beijing adopts a functionalist approach to its integration of Hong Kong and Macao into China, in the hope that economic cooperation will both nurture the spirit of patriotism in the two Special Administrative Regions (SARs), and facilitate the ultimate institutional integration. Many analysts and pundits believe that this strategy has encountered bottom-up resistance in Hong Kong but should work better in Macao considering Macao's pro-Beijing stance. However, this article finds that Beijing's territorial rescaling strategies have de facto encouraged Macao elites to utilise their economic and political privileges, and exploit the border differentials as economic opportunities, thereby causing uneven development across borders and reinforcing rather than removing border separations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
165871
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In popular narratives, intellectual and media analysts believe the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan is a contestation for potential hydrocarbon reserves and other maritime rights which are per se divisible, but nationalism – particularly on China side – and relative power change between the two competing claimants make these territories increasingly indivisible and the dispute war-prone. Based on a review over People's Daily’s coverage of the disputes and other secondary information, this article reveals a different scenario by highlighting the political meanings of disputed territories for national cohesion and regime self-preservation. It finds, Beijing’s strategic moves in the disputes are influenced by its efforts at different occasions to de-legitimate Republic of China at Taiwan and defend its core interests – namely Taiwan and the "One-China" principle, to appease the patriotism in Hong Kong and facilitate the latter’s stable reversion to China in 1990s, and what is more, to rally popular support at home. In addition, Beijing’s Diaoyu/Senkaku strategy did not follow a carefully calculated path, but was mostly reactive to the contingencies and ultimately took shape through the incremental accumulation of previous policies and behaviours.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
156261
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Many China analysts believe Beijing relies on nationalism to shore up its legitimacy of rule and its recent assertiveness, especially in salient territorial issues, is increasingly defined by such nationalism. However, based on a critical review of the existing studies, this article doubts the validity of this nationalism-foreign-assertiveness nexus because most questions that are important and necessary to elucidate the causal mechanisms remain largely unanswered, therefore making this popular narrative biased and somewhat flawed. This article addresses four questions as follows: what Chinese nationalism is, how ‘rising’ nationalism is in China, Beijing’s attitudes towards nationalism, and its foreign policy implications. This article concludes that nationalism’s foreign policy effects may be more moderate than most have assumed, and thus calls for intellectuals’ efforts to move beyond the stereotyped image and make further rigorous analysis.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|