| Summary/Abstract |
China’s capabilities and prestige in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) were stronger than the Koguryo Kingdom, but Koguryo resisted China’s tributary system more than other countries during 598–668. This article unpacks the unique role of the tributary system within Chinese foreign policy toward Koguryo, and it shows how the symbolic concept of political prestige affected China’s decisions to go to war against Koguryo during the Sui and Tang dynasties. It highlights the role of status and legitimacy that the Chinese emperors attached to China’s tributary systems, and argues that these status concerns, rather than the material factors emphasized by offensive realism and defensive realism, drove Chinese behavior. China’s capabilities were rising compared to those of the Koguryo kingdom, so there were no incentives for preventive war, and political discourse among China’s political elites showed great concern over status. Their justifications of military expeditions and heated debates in the Chinese court provide strong evidence illustrating this consistent struggle to reclaim supremacy in Northeastern Asia. The finding of the study indicates that Asian history should not simply be treated as empirical data to test Western international relations (IR) theory; rather, Asian history can contribute to theory building in IR.
|