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1 |
ID:
181609
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Summary/Abstract |
The real and present history of American warfare is one of outsourcing; of volatile marriages of convenience between the United States and its partisans, partners, and proxies. Like all relationships, they come with mixed expectations and varied intentions.
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2 |
ID:
181608
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Summary/Abstract |
The future of U.S.-Russia relations is largely America’s choice. If the United States cannot settle for anything short of unquestioned hegemony, Russia will indubitably prove a serious impediment, prepared to challenge it.
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3 |
ID:
181611
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Summary/Abstract |
The issue is not whether the United States will pursue an “open world,” but how, and how expensively, it is forced to adjust to the realities of international life before the consequences of the doctrine run amok.
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4 |
ID:
181610
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Summary/Abstract |
A zero-based assessment of U.S. interests and policies in the Greater Middle East is long overdue. The new geostrategic map of the region, the legacy of failures, and the imperatives of great power competition require a new mindset.
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5 |
ID:
181612
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Summary/Abstract |
Predictions that Russia or China would take the lead in the fight against the pandemic have not panned out. Instead, countries around the world are clamoring for forging new trade, technological, and health alliances with the United States.
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6 |
ID:
181607
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Summary/Abstract |
At some point in the next generation, the Kremlin will realize that the United States is not its principal national security challenge.
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7 |
ID:
181613
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Summary/Abstract |
China and Russia consider themselves great powers, and there is agreement in both Beijing and Moscow on cooperating to limit or constrain America’s ability to dominate international relations and challenge their sovereignty.
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