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1 |
ID:
182945
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Summary/Abstract |
Examining China’s policy towards Latin America from 1949 to the present day, this article uncovers a puzzle about China in Latin America: while the guiding doctrine of China’s policy towards the region has never changed (i.e. “South–South Cooperation” on the basis of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”), there is a difference in terms of its policy goal between then and now (i.e. a very revisionist and politically focused goal until the late 1970s as compared to a less revisionist and economically focused one today). Based on the theory of systemic constructivism, this article demonstrates that the change of the interactions between China and other countries in our world (from isolation and confrontation to engagement and interdependence) has changed China’s perception about the nature of the international system, as well as its identity and interests in the system, which in turn has changed its policy goal towards Latin America and the “Global South” in general.
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2 |
ID:
182949
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Summary/Abstract |
The analysis discusses domestic sources of China’s diplomatic offensive in Europe following the outbreak of Covid-19, with a focus on the central and eastern parts of the continent. By examining selected case studies of countries competing for Chinese medical supplies in the time of the global crisis, it demonstrates how the party-state leadership with “Xi Jinping at the core” has been promoting the narrative of its transparent and timely response to the outbreak of the pandemic, while at the same time nurturing its image as a (benevolent) global leader in the struggle against the coronavirus. The article argues that mask diplomacy has served two overlapping domestic and foreign policy goals: aiming to cover up China’s leadership’s failure to contain the pandemic in its initial stage, while also turning acts of foreign gratitude to its advantage in seeking domestic public approval and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party governance.
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3 |
ID:
182950
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Summary/Abstract |
With China’s global rise, both its state leadership and key academics have engaged in developing a civilisational discourse for the twenty-first century partly based on ancient cosmological concepts. This article explores the meanings of and intentions behind this discourse, including its promise of a Chinese-led world order, and discusses its intended audience and international appeal. In the backdrop of theoretical debates on empires and their missions, the article claims that without a corresponding cultural appeal, China’s rising economic power and geostrategic clout are insufficient conditions to realise an empire in the classical sense. Growing inconsistencies mar the country’s imperial ambitions, such as those between a global civilising outreach and a toughening domestic embrace. Instead, imperial rhetoric is cautiously integrated in the party-state’s restoration of a Chinese “empire within,” indicating self-centredness and a lurking re-traditionalising of Chinese state power.
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4 |
ID:
182946
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Summary/Abstract |
To avoid the middle-income trap, China’s leaders call for innovation to accelerate development in China. However, since it is not clear how innovation and (regional) development reinforce each other, there is no blueprint strategy for successful innovation capacity building throughout China. Due to resource scarcity in its “Western” regions, it is thus far from certain that innovation capacity building will support regional development. Departing from sociology of knowledge, narrations are constitutive of policy practice. This article analyses narrative patterns of policy experts to understand how innovation capacity building and regional development are negotiated in China’s lagging “West.” The comparison of Yunnan and Chongqing cases demonstrates that innovation capacity building is primarily infused with theoretical expectations: resource scarcity does not allow for grounding innovation as a strategy of regional development in the local context. This leads to narrations of “local” alternatives to innovation capacity building in centralist China.
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5 |
ID:
182948
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Summary/Abstract |
This article explores a facet of the Chinese propaganda apparatus that has yet to receive sufficient academic attention: the murky ecosystem of “semi-official” party-state presences on Chinese social media. With a particular focus on WeChat public accounts, this investigation responds to two critical research questions: first, what differentiates official party-state social media presences from semi-official presences, and second, what unique role do semi-official WeChat accounts play in the contemporary Chinese propaganda apparatus? This article samples content published by five dyads of official and semi-official WeChat public accounts during the first fifteen days of June 2019. The results of this comparative, case-study-based discourse analysis support two conclusions. First, semi-official WeChat accounts posture as independent from the party-state in order to attract large followings and gain credibility. Second, semi-official WeChat public accounts operate as “astroturfed influencers,” enabling the Chinese propaganda apparatus to covertly manipulate online discourse with extraordinary efficiency.
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6 |
ID:
182951
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Summary/Abstract |
While China’s experience of using special economic zones (SEZs) for advancing economic development is a model increasingly adopted in other developing countries, the processes involved in replicating this model elsewhere and the outcomes of such replication remain little understood. This review article’s nested examination of three relevant strands of literature and two case studies of India and Ethiopia indicates that successful replication of China’s SEZ-led development would involve deliberate processes of adaptation from the original model. Replication must be “smart,” by taking into account the temporal, systemic, and other discrepancies between the Chinese model and the replicating country; replicating the benefits of China’s approach whilst avoiding the drawbacks; and maximising the positive effects of direct Chinese involvement and investments while reducing negative repercussions.
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7 |
ID:
182947
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Summary/Abstract |
The requirement for “self-development” through the ceaseless acquisition of skills and credentials has long been central for young adults in China. However, due to the multiple and unpredictable demands of social institutions, many social actors also prime the cultivation of a self that does not succumb to immediate occupational and material impositions. In this article, I describe how young adults in a second-tier city pursue a model of personhood that brings together socio-economic competence and singular individuality. These individuals aspire to expand their range of experiences and their spatial mobility, thereby reifying an image of a self that transcends narrow social roles and networks. Drawing on Jean-Paul Sartre's dualistic philosophy, I analyse young adults’ attempts to realise individualised selves by destabilising their ontological ground. I argue that this phenomenon is magnified in China through widespread notions of a “moral crisis” and its supposable suppression of social actors’ agency.
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