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| 1 |
ID:
194469
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the dark of a July night in 2018, a 5-billion-cubic-metre torrent of muddy water crashed through rooftops and ripped through the downstream villages of southeast Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). An auxiliary “saddle” dam had collapsed in the US$1.02 billion Xe Pian-Xe Namnoy (XPXN) Hydropower Project that was still under construction and had just reached financial contractual close five years prior, in 2013. In the aftermath of the collapse, official state narratives pointed to extreme weather conditions and “unforeseen” construction and engineering miscalculations, viewing soil conditions as the primary culprit. This paper examines the financial dimensions of dam failure and introduces the term “fast finance”: financier-driven timelines that have drastically expedited and shortened the legal, social, and pre-construction processes involved in hydropower dam projects to the detriment of dam safety, due diligence, and local participatory input. Extreme weather and anthropogenic climate change are not sole explanatory factors in the XPXN dam disaster. This paper highlights the also significant role of financial and political interests as contributing factors in dam safety and failure alongside extreme weather. The paper challenges conventional “natural disaster” framing of dam collapse by bringing into focus ex-ante political decision-making, financial engineering, and construction planning prior to dam construction to highlight the ways in which the XPXN catastrophe also had anthropogenic and “unnatural” contributing factors. Fast finance encompasses the role of temporality and the responsibility of state-business actors in ex-ante financial and infrastructure decisions that conclude with catastrophic outcomes. The article examines the re-engineering of contemporary dam finance through a case study of Lao PDR and argues that issues of financial engineering should be examined alongside other forms of civil, mechanical, structural, and hydrological engineering in the analysis of dam disasters. The temporal logics of financial actors—particularly the financialized logic of fast finance—has displaced the public-good-producing logic of patient capital. Financial logics shape and condition other forms of engineering and construction and are central to considerations of dam safety and accountability. Naturalizing discourses around extreme weather and aging dams deflect from the financial decisions and policy action, or inaction, of state-business actors to prevent dam collapse.
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| 2 |
ID:
185233
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| Summary/Abstract |
The contemporary US/Japan-Chinese rivalry and tension around dam building in the Mekong region is often mistakenly seen as the US and Japan’s reactive response to recently growing Chinese diplomatic and economic influence in the region. In fact, the United States and Japan have been critical architects of institutional and financial engineering for hydropower development in the Mekong region, which predates involvement by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The factors and dynamics involved in significant lending regime shifts away from a liberal hydropower finance regime to an export credit driven model premised on Asian economic statecraft is an understudied topic. This article fills part of this gap through a case study of evolving hydro-financing regimes in Lao PDR from the 1970s to the present. The study draws on extensive ethnographic work in Laos, Japan, Thailand, and the United States with local and external political elites, hydro-financing technocrats, and business actors and gains additional insights from analysis of primary firm, institutional, and government documents. The article finds that the role of economic crises and their impact on the relative economic power of hydropower financing regimes as well as their ideational impact on borrower regimes are significant in explaining shifting patterns in lending regime dominance.
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