| ID | 197910 |
| Title Proper | Cognitive ability in matching with strategic uncertainty |
| Other Title Information | An experimental study |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hu, Xinquan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Strategyproof mechanisms have become the predominant choice for educational institutions. However, both laboratory experiments and empirical evidence highlight the persistent occurrence of strategic misreporting, leading to adverse consequences. This underscores the need to examine the reporting strategies of students, particularly those with varying cognitive abilities, across different decision environments. We present an experimental comprehension test of reporting strategies using computerized opponents to precisely control the levels of strategic uncertainty. The results reveal that removing strategic uncertainty does not significantly affect truth-telling rates. However, subjects with median cognitive ability are more truthful under strategic uncertainty, especially when information is incomplete. Additionally, providing information about priorities has a negative and significant impact on truth-telling rates. The findings of this research demonstrate that constructing a simplified market environment using computerized agents and providing relevant feedback to students can effectively enhance their understanding of the matching mechanism and nudge them to make optimal strategy choices. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Economic Review Vol. 88, Dec 2024: p.102295 |
| Journal Source | China Economic Review 2024-11 88 |
| Key Words | School Choice ; Laboratory Experiment ; Cognitive Ability ; Strategyproofness |