| ID | 058933 |
| Title Proper | Managing competition: politics and the building of independent regulatory institutions |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mukherji, Rahul |
| Publication | Oct 2004. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This essay compares institutional reform in two key infrastructure sectors: telecommunications and power. While reform in India’s telecom sector was relatively successful, the power sector fared much less well. Why? To be sure, reforming power tariffs presented more political obstacles than did regulating telecom pricing, but this does not fully explain the divergent outcomes in the two sectors. This paper argues that successful reform in the telecom sector resulted from its reliance on a “homegrown” approach, itself inspired by ideational changes within the prime minister’s office. This helped reformers to devise reforms that would attract private-sector investment. The power sector depended on World Bank ideas to a much greater extent, making it difficult to instill regulatory confidence among private-sector actors. The other key variable explaining the differing outcomes was institutional: whereas India’s constitution confers responsibility for the power sector to state governments – indeed, state-level regulators were established alongside their central government counterpart – telecommunications is almost entirely a central government competence. Thus, facing fewer coordination problems, telecommunications was a more conducive sector for institutional reform. The paper concludes by arguing for strengthened, yet accountable, regulators in both sectors. |
| `In' analytical Note | India Review Vol. 3, No.4; Oct 2004: p 278-305 |
| Journal Source | India Review Vol: 3 No 4 |
| Key Words | Internal Politics-India ; India ; International Relations-India ; India-Economy |