| ID | 060836 |
| Title Proper | Operation Anaconda |
| Other Title Information | perception meets reality in the hills of Afghanistan |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hastert, Paul L |
| Publication | Jan-Feb 2005. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The initial encounters between Al Qaeda and the U.S. military taught both a series of lessons that reverberate across the battlefields of Afghanistan today. Both sides entered the fray with preconceived ideas of their enemy—ideas that disappeared on the battlefields of the Shahi-Kot valley. The United States was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the siege of Tora Bora. Their battleplan called for a lightning fast operation using highly mobile U.S. and Afghan forces to envelop the enemy, but failures of intelligence and the fog of war transformed Anaconda into a long, slow struggle against an often invisible foe. Al Qaeda had all the advantages of terrain and defense but was unable to cause the massive casualties they thought would drive the American invaders from Afghanistan. Both sides left the battlefield with valuable lessons that have prevented any similar encounters since silence returned to the Shahi-Kot. |
| `In' analytical Note | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 28, No.1; Jan-Feb 2005: p 11-20 |
| Journal Source | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol: 28 No 1 |
| Key Words | Operation Anaconda ; Afghanistan ; Afghanistan war |