| ID | 069892 |
| Title Proper | Operational code of Mao Zedong |
| Other Title Information | defensive or offensive realist? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Feng, Huiyun |
| Publication | 2005. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam War shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated Verbs in Context System (VICS) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals a more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, but this result cannot be generalized across situations, as the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 14, No. 4; Oct-Dec 2005: p637-662 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 14 No 4 |
| Key Words | China ; Strategic Culture ; International Relations-China ; Mao Zedong |