| ID | 072672 |
| Title Proper | Filling in the 'Unknowns' |
| Other Title Information | hypothesis-based intelligence and the Rumsfeld Commission |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ryan, Maria |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In 2003 the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans employed a hypothesis-based methodology to deliver the now discredited intelligence that justified the Iraq war. The 1976 'Team B', which was also heavily influenced by neoconservatives and used the same methodology, has been recognized as a precedent. There is, however, another precedent, the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission, which challenged CIA predictions on the ballistic missile threat to the US. Lobbied for by many of the same conservatives and neoconservatives, the Commission used the same analytical style as Team B and the OSP. The now discredited intelligence on Iraq was not a 'failure' or 'mistake', but a method, tried and tested by the right, of challenging the CIA on political grounds. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 21, No. 2; Apr 2006: p286-315 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol: 21 No 2 |
| Key Words | United States ; Intelligence ; Rumsfeld Commission ; Hypothesis-Based Methodology |