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ID072880
Title ProperThinking proliferation theoretically
LanguageENG
AuthorSamaddar, Sujeet
Publication2005.
Summary / Abstract (Note)Addressing the challenge of proliferation cannot be successful unless the theoretical underpinnings that rationalize acquisition or renunciation of nuclear weapons are understood. Just as theories explain the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation in international affairs, similarly theories must also explain the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation or restraint. Again, just as sound theory helped policymakers in understanding deterrence politics, a theoretical understanding of the dynamics of proliferation that addresses both the effects of nuclear proliferation and its fundamental causes should benefit nonproliferation policymakers. Long-term idealist goals of a nuclear-weapons-free world need to be theoretically reconciled with realist considerations of the obvious power and prestige that is associated with nuclear weapons. Thinking proliferation theoretically must begin with identifying the stakeholders and spoilers of the contemporary nonproliferation bargain. This article proposes a theory without presenting case studies and reserves policy prescriptions based on these theoretical considerations for a subsequent discussion, keeping in mind Nye's observation that "parsimony suggests that we start with the simple causes, see how much they explain, and go on to more complexity as needed." Some simple causes are stated and the catalysts that spur proliferation reactions are probed in the hopes of provoking "thinking proliferation theoretically."
`In' analytical NoteNonproliferation Review Vol. 12, No. 3; Nov 2005: p435-471
Journal SourceNonproliferation Review Vol: 12 No 3
Key WordsNuclear Proliferation ;  Nuclear Restraint ;  Theory ;  Utility Theory ;  Prospect Theory ;  Deterrence