| ID | 073368 |
| Title Proper | Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions |
| Other Title Information | why some democracies redistribute more than others |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Iversen, Torben ; Soskice, David |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 100, No. 2; May 2006: p165-181 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review Vol: 100 No 2 |
| Key Words | Political System ; Electoral System ; Redistribution |