| ID | 073369 |
| Title Proper | Electoral incentives in mixed-member systems |
| Other Title Information | party, posts, and Zombie politicians in Japan |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Pekkanen, Robert ; Nyblade, Benjamin ; Krauss, Ellis S |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a "best loser" or "zombie" provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 100, No. 2; May 2006: p183-193 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review Vol: 100 No 2 |
| Key Words | Japan ; Political System ; Electoral System |