| ID | 074557 |
| Title Proper | Asymmetric information, mediation, and conflict management |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Rauchhaus, Robert W |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines mediation in conflicts using both a game-theoretic model and a quantitative analysis. The game-theoretic model suggests that mediator effectiveness rests primarily on the ability of third parties to provide critical information about the disputants' reservation points. The empirical analysis finds that mediation that targets asymmetric information is a highly effective form of conflict management. Moreover, the results suggest that mediation outperforms other forms of third-party intervention, including those that entail coercion. Both the model and quantitative analysis indicate that impartial mediators will generally outperform biased ones. Along with providing new information on conflict management, the quantitative analysis also has broader implications for IR theory. The results provide empirical support for the rationalist claim that asymmetric information is one of the root causes of war. |
| `In' analytical Note | World Politics Vol. 58, No. 2; Jan 2006: p207-241 |
| Journal Source | World Politics Vol: 58 No 2 |
| Key Words | Mediation ; Intervention ; Asymmetric Information ; Conflict Management ; International Relations Theory ; Game-Theoretic Model |