| ID | 074630 |
| Title Proper | Friends like these |
| Other Title Information | counterinsurgency and the war on terrorism |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Byman, Daniel L |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | U.S. allies that are ªghting al-Qaida-linked insurgencies often suffer illegitimate regimes, civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup, economic backwardness, and discriminatory societies. These problems, coupled with allies' divergent interests, serve to weaken allied military and security forces tactically, operationally, and strategically. The ability of the United States to change its allies' behavior is limited, despite the tremendous difªculties these problems create, because relying on allied forces is a key component of U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism and the U.S. goal of handing off security to Iraqi military forces. To reduce the effects of allies' weaknesses, the United States should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces and at times act more like a third party to a conºict. In addition, Washington must have realistic expectations of what training and other efforts can accomplish. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Security Vol. 31, No. 2; Fall 2006: p79-115 |
| Journal Source | International Security Vol: 31 No 2 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; War on Terrorism ; United States ; Strategy ; International Relations ; Terrorism - Prevention |