| ID | 074658 |
| Title Proper | Does third-party enforcement or domestic institutions promote enduring peace after civil wars? Policy lessons from an empirical test |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mukherjee, Bumba |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What causes peaceful resolution of civil wars to endure rather than to collapse into renewed fighting? Existing studies predict that third-party peace enforcement by the United Nations (UN) or domestic institutions such as democracy, parliamentary, and presidential institutions and the proportional representation (PR) electoral system promotes enduring peace in societies that have emerged from a civil war. However, extant empirical works test the effect of third-party enforcement but not the impact of domestic institutions on peace after civil wars. Hence, I test the impact of democracy, presidential, and parliamentary institutions, electoral systems-PR and majoritarian-and third-party enforcement by the UN on the durability of peace after termination of civil wars. Results from a bootstrapped Weibull duration model show that democracy and the PR electoral system significantly reduces the likelihood that civil war may recur, but that third-party enforcement by the UN does not have a significant effect on the hazard rate of peace spells. A brief case study analysis of recent attempts to build democratic institutions in Cambodia and Kosovo by the international community also supports the claims posited in this article. |
| `In' analytical Note | Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 2, No. 4; Oct 2006: p405-430 |
| Journal Source | Foreign Policy Analysis Vol: 2 No 4 |
| Key Words | Civil Wars ; Peaceful Resolution ; United Nations ; Third Party Enforcement ; Domestic Institutions ; Cambodia ; Kosovo |