| ID | 075802 |
| Title Proper | Deterrence in the cold war and the war on terror |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Levine, David K ; Levine, Robert A |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We are grateful to Martin McGuire for guidance and to the National Science Foundation (Grant SES?03?14713) for financial support. We examine how the theory of deterrence differs from a Cold?War type of setting to a War?on?Terror type of setting. Our central conclusion is that deterrence of terrorist states should resemble Cold War deterrence. Deterring terrorist groups is more difficult. In either case, failure of deterrence will have far less traumatic consequences than during the Cold War, unless we ourselves are overcome by fear. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 17, No.6; Dec 2006: p605-617 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 17, No.6; Dec 2006: p605-617 |
| Key Words | Terrorism ; Cold War ; Game Theory ; Deterence ; Rationality |