| ID | 076715 |
| Title Proper | Lessons learned from Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Fitzpatrick, Mark |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Tipped off by Iran's efforts to acquire uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, despite the economic illogic, the United States and its allies identified Tehran's nuclear weapons intentions early on and took effective action to stop several countries from inadvertently assisting that program. This postponed the worst-case scenario of when Iran might have the bomb, which for 15 years has been estimated at being five to ten years away. The intelligence success gave insufficient attention, however, to Iran's procurement efforts through non-state actors on the black market. Intelligence on Iran's motivations also will be important to devising effective policies. Those motivations include a need to achieve prestige, assert national pride, and secure dominance in the Gulf region. Iran's clerical leaders also see a nuclear capability as the best way to ensure their survival despite outside threats and internal opposition. At least 10 indicators of military involvement in the program have become known, reinforcing the judgment that Tehran is still intent on developing a latent nuclear weapons capability. Despite the confirmed evidence, the international community has not been able to change Iran's strategic calculations. The intelligence indicators will need to be corroborated if the world is to summon the will to put firm pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear pursuits. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 13, No.3; Nov 2006: p527-537 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 13, No.3; Nov 2006: p527-537 |
| Key Words | Nonproliferation ; Iran ; Intelligence ; IAEA ; Military Indicators ; Nuclear Weapons ; Black Market ; Uranium Enrichment ; Plutonium Reprocessing |