| ID | 076776 |
| Title Proper | Second thoughts about a first strike |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Sokov, Nikolai |
| Publication | 2007. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article critiques recent articles in Foreign Affairs and International Security that argue that in the foreseeable future the United States could acquire an assured first-strike capability vis-à-vis Russia and China thanks to technological improvements in U.S. nuclear delivery systems and a general decline in the numbers and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces. Notwithstanding these articles, this analysis finds that mutual deterrence will persist regardless of the scale of possible future imbalances because deterrence is a highly flexible phenomenon. The pertinent question is not whether the United States will be able, in a surprise first strike, to cripple severely Russian response capabilities, but whether political stakes in any foreseeable conflict could justify the risk of even a small retaliatory strike on the United States. This article also assesses whether the Foreign Affairs and International Security articles could inadvertently exacerbate an already highly charged anti-American sentiment in Russia, possibly laying the foundation for a revitalization and expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 14, No.1; mar 2007: p139-147 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 14, No.1; mar 2007: p139-147 |
| Key Words | Deterrence ; Nuclear Weapons ; First Strike ; United States ; Russia |