| ID | 077137 |
| Title Proper | Auxiliary force or national army? Afghanistan's 'ANA' and the counter-Insurgency effort, 2002-2006 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Giustozzi, Antonio |
| Publication | 2007. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called 'Afghan National Army' run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a 'national' army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a 'national' army. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 18, No.1; Mar 2007: p45-67 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 18, No.1; Mar 2007: p45-67 |
| Key Words | Afghan National Army ; ANA ; Counter Insurgency ; Afghanistan - War, 2002-2006 |