| ID | 077739 |
| Title Proper | Downside of decentralization |
| Other Title Information | armed clientelism in Colombia |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Eaton, Kent |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In recent years, decentralization and regional autonomy measures have figured prominently in negotiations designed to end some of the world's most important conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Reforms that shift powers to subnational units deserve the attention of those who are trying to promote security via institutional design, but the risks associated with these territorial reforms are considerable. When political and economic resources are transferred to subnational governments in the attempt to create meaningful access to the political system for former combatants, the great risk is that these same resources can be used to finance a continuation of the armed struggle instead. In response to the popularity of territorial reforms in many post-conflict settings, this paper sounds a cautionary note by evaluating the negative impact of decentralization on security in Colombia, site of Latin America's longest and deadliest armed conflict. After analyzing the design decisions of reformers who hoped that decentralization would help end the conflict, I argue that decentralization in fact financed the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right. Thanks to the weakness of the police in much of the national territory, guerrillas and paramilitaries have been able to use decentralized resources to destabilize the state, limiting even further its monopoly over the use of force and creating what are in effect parallel states on the left and right |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 15, No.4; Oct-Dec 2006: p533-561 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol. 15, No.4; Oct-Dec 2006: p533-561 |
| Key Words | Armed Conflict ; Colombia ; Security |