| ID | 079629 |
| Title Proper | Stengthening safeguards and nuclear disarmament |
| Other Title Information | is there a connection |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Acton, James M |
| Publication | 2007. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The nuclear weapon states see International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as an important means of preventing proliferation and, therefore, of enhancing their own security. Many non-nuclear weapon states are, however, reluctant to accept the IAEA's Additional Protocol or even consider developing new safeguards instruments. They frequently claim that this is because the nuclear weapon states have failed to make sufficient progress toward their disarmament pledge, as embodied in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This viewpoint discusses whether the nuclear weapon states should adopt a strategy of working toward disarmament as a means of strengthening safeguards. Three questions are explored. First, are the weapon states right to see safeguards as an effective means of preventing proliferation? Second, will progress by the nuclear weapon states toward disarmament strengthen the safeguards regime? Third, what does that actually involve? There is a "political" connection between safeguards and disarmament. The weapon states should seriously consider exploiting that connection, with the aims of encouraging the adoption of additional safeguards by some states and putting pressure on others that use the slow pace of disarmament as an excuse for recalcitrance |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 14, No.3; 2007: p325-335 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 14, No.3; 2007: p325-335 |
| Key Words | Safeguards ; International Atomic Energy Agency ; Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Disarmament |