| ID | 080146 |
| Title Proper | Security dependence and asymmetric aggressive bargaining |
| Other Title Information | North Korea's policy toward the two superpowers |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Izumikawa, Yasuhiro |
| Publication | 2007. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article addresses why small powers initiate aggressive bargaining with great power allies and adversaries despite the risk of provocation. Although the cause of such behavior is usually attributed to the regime type or the "irrationality" of an aggressive small power, this article explores how a system-level factor affects incentives for a small power to conduct aggressive bargaining. In so doing, I develop a theory of asymmetric aggressive bargaining, which shows that a small power's high security dependence upon its ally or adversary makes its use of aggressive bargaining rational. The empirical analysis suggests that the proposed theory effectively explains changes in North Korea's policies toward the United States and the Soviet Union after the Korean War |
| `In' analytical Note | Asian Security Vol. 3, No.1; 2007: p45-71 |
| Journal Source | Asian Security Vol. 3, No.1; 2007: p45-71 |
| Key Words | North Korea ; United States ; North Korea - Foreign Policy - United States ; United States - Foreign Policy - North Korea |