| ID | 080506 |
| Title Proper | United States hegemony and the new economics of defense |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Caverley, Jonathan D |
| Publication | 2007. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Liberal theory asserts that the need for cost-effective, technologically advanced weapons requires the United States to acquiesce to increasing defense globalization even as this restrains U.S. power. Realist logic dictates that the United States should resist defense liberalization to retain its self-sufficiency. This is a false choice; the United States encourages defense globalization in order to extend its international political influence. This paper proposes an alternate theory of technological hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive R&D investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American preponderance. Modern weapons' complexity and economies of scale tend to produce monopolies, and the value chain for the production of these monopolistic goods is dominated by the systems integration techniques of prime contracting firms. In turn these prime contractors remain largely enthralled by U.S. market power. The United States gains international influence by controlling the distribution of these weapons. Put simply, technology with international political effects is likely to have international political origins |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol, 16 No. 4; Oct-Dec 2007: p598-614 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol, 16 No. 4; Oct-Dec 2007: p598-614 |
| Key Words | United States ; Hegemony ; Defence Economics ; Globalization |