| ID | 080727 |
| Title Proper | Did the United States Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Malkasian, Carter |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | A common argument is that the United States deployed inadequate forces
to secure Iraq. This paper attempts to back that argument with empiricalevidence. Evidence collected in Al Anbar province strongly suggests that a
larger number of forces would have reduced insurgent activity in 2004 and
2005. During this period, suppressing large-scale insurgent activity required
directly protecting the population through traditional counterinsurgency
techniques, such as patrolling, manning outposts, and running checkpoints.
Unfortunately, scarcity of US forces meant that such labor-intensive operations
could not be sustained in key areas. Some have argued that the United
States should have focused on building indigenous forces as a means of
providing the necessary numbers. Yet indigenous forces offered no
alternative. Even with embedded advisors and air support, indigenous forces
could not survive against a vibrant insurgency sustained by local support.
Nothing substituted for large numbers of US ground forces. This conclusion
places scarcity of US forces as a major cause of the fiasco in Iraq. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence Studies Vol. 8, No.1; Mar 2008: p78-104 |
| Journal Source | Defence Studies Vol. 8, No.1; Mar 2008: p78-104 |
| Key Words | Insurgency ; Iraq War ; United States ; Iraq |