| ID | 080867 |
| Title Proper | Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Aldrich , Richard J |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | During the Cold War the UK's principal military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), together with wartime command of NATO's Northern Army Group. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces ensured that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. As yet we know very little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with NATO allies. This article attempts to address these neglected issues, ending with the impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the mid-1970s. It concludes that the arrangements made by Whitehall for support to BAOR from national assets during crisis or transition to war were - at best - improbable. Accordingly, over the years, BAOR developed its own unique assets in the realm of both intelligence collection and special operations in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of co |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 31, No.1; Feb 2008: p89-122 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 31, No.1; Feb 2008: p89-122 |
| Key Words | British Army ; Cold War ; GCHQ ; Germany ; Intelligence ; Special Operations |