| ID | 081248 |
| Title Proper | National unification and mistrust |
| Other Title Information | bargaining power and the prospects for a PRC/Taiwan agreement |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kastner, Scott L ; Rector, Chad |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Can states that mistrust each other as much as the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan reach unification agreements? Unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds: the unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to use its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. Our argument accounts for two historical cases-the nineteenth century Argentine and German unifications-and helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan. We describe several possible future scenarios for cross-Strait relations and show that democratization in the PRC is not a necessary prerequisite for a unification agreement between the mainland and Taiwan |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 17, No.1; Jan-Mar 2008: p39-71 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol. 17, No.1; Jan-Mar 2008: p39-71 |
| Key Words | Taiwan ; China ; Unification Agreement ; Cross-Strait Relations ; Democracy |