| ID | 081551 |
| Title Proper | Mitigating the moral Hazard of humanitarian intervention |
| Other Title Information | Lessons from Economics |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kuperman, Alan J |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or the Responsibility to Protect, resembles a social insurance policy to protect ethnic groups against genocide and ethnic cleansing. If a state perpetrates such genocidal violence, the norm calls for a payout-up to and including military intervention-to protect the group and ensure its security, often by enhancing its autonomy from the state. Unfortunately, this leads to a common pathology of insurance-moral hazard-whereby the expected payout for a loss unintentionally encourages excessively risky or fraudulent behavior. Thus, some militants may rebel despite the risk of provoking state retaliation, because they expect any resulting atrocities to attract intervention that facilitates their rebellion. This article summarizes recently published evidence for this dynamic, explores the feasibility of adapting insurance strategies that mitigate moral hazard, and then proposes a reform of humanitarian intervention based on the most feasible of these adapted strategies. |
| `In' analytical Note | Global Governance Vol. 14, No.2; Jne 2008: p219-240 |
| Journal Source | Global Governance Vol. 14, No.2; Jne 2008: p219-240 |
| Key Words | Humanitarian Intervention ; Moral hazard ; Genocide ; Ethnic Conflict ; Responsibility to Protect ; Norms |