| ID | 082408 |
| Title Proper | Ballistic missile proliferation |
| Other Title Information | an empirical investigation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Barkley, Daniel |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This analysis examines ballistic missile proliferation in the context of strategic interactions among neighboring states. The analysis finds that when faced with ballistic missile threats, nations respond rationally and acquire ballistic missiles as a deterrent. Using a panel data set of 119 countries from 1967 to 1997, this study shows that the probability of a country procuring ballistic missiles increases nonlinearly as the number of bordering states with ballistic missiles increases. Although international norms arising from the Missile Technology Control Regime reduced the probability of missile proliferation, these externalities did not offset a state's decision to arm in response to ballistic missile arsenals in neighboring states. This analysis also finds that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) increased the probability of proliferation in two ways: first, because ballistic missiles provided states ``ensured penetration'' of a rival's air defenses; and second, because SAMs reduced the ability of a rival to retaliate against a ballistic missile attack |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 52, No.3; Jun 2008: p455-473 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 52, No.3; Jun 2008: p455-473 |
| Key Words | Missiles ; Proliferation ; Strategic Interactions ; Norms |