| ID | 082456 |
| Title Proper | Strategy and Power: the royal navy, the foreign office and the blockade, 1914-1917 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kennedy, Greg |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Conventional wisdom, and much of the existing literature, puts the Royal
Navy at the centre of Britain's World War I blockade strategy. This article
argues that such was not the case. While operationally the RN was
central, strategically it was the Foreign Office that controlled the strategic
direction of the blockade. Indeed, given the political dimensions of any
blockade it is questionable that any such activity is ever the sole domain of
a navy. Relying on primary sources this article highlights competing
strategic frictions that existed in the British comprehensive approach to
formulating a viable blockade strategy, how they were overcome, and
what costs such |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence Studies Vol. 8, No.2; Jun 2008: p190-206 |
| Journal Source | Defence Studies Vol. 8, No.2; Jun 2008: p190-206 |
| Key Words | Great Britain ; Navy ; Maritime Policy |