| ID | 082467 |
| Title Proper | Choosing how to cooperate |
| Other Title Information | a repeated public-goods model of international relations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Stone, Randall W ; Slantchev, Branislav L ; London, Tamar R |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | International relations theory has borrowed important intuitions from Olson's static public-goods model (hegemonic stability) and the repeated prisoners' dilemma (theories of international cooperation), and arguments often combine implications from both models. We develop a general, repeated public-goods model. We then allow the qualitative dimensions of cooperation to emerge endogenously: agreements can have broad or narrow membership and entail deep or shallow commitments; they can be multilateral or discriminatory; they can be ad hoc or institutionalized. We find that the relationship between the distribution of power and international cooperation is complex: a large leading state forms a narrow coalition of intensive contributors, and builds institutions, while a smaller leading state forms a broader coalition that makes shallow contributions, and is more inclined to multilateralism |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, No.2; Jun 2008: p335-362 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, No.2; Jun 2008: p335-362 |
| Key Words | International Relations Theory ; International Cooperation ; International Relations |