ID | 082808 |
Title Proper | Operational research as counterfactual history |
Other Title Information | A Retrospective Analysis of the Use of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in the German invasion of France and Flanders, May-June 1940 |
Language | ENG |
Author | Kirby, Maurice ; Godwin, Matthew |
Publication | 2008. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | In 1955 British Operational Research (OR) analysts attached to the British Army conducted a hypothetical study of the likely impact of nuclear weapons as they might have been deployed by Anglo-French forces in resisting the German invasion of North-East France in May-June 1940. The study formed the first major attempt by OR analysts to assess the use of nuclear weapons at the tactical level. In deriving lessons from 1940, OR analysts focused on several battlefronts where nuclear weapons could have provided relief to defending forces. Consideration was also given to a situation where the invading forces were also nuclear-equipped. As this paper demonstrates, valuable insights were gained from the events of 1940 on the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons. However, in neglecting the wider strategic environment, OR analysts failed to consider the possibility that a nuclear land battle fought in Europe between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact could precipitate a strategic nuclear exchange |
`In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 31, No.4; Aug 2008: p633-660 |
Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 31, No.4; Aug 2008: p633-660 |
Key Words | Operational Research ; Battle of France ; World War II ; War Gaming ; Nuclear Weapons |