| ID | 083201 |
| Title Proper | Britain's need for a nuclear deterrent |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lewis, Julian |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The effectiveness of nuclear weapons in deterring war lies not just in their
ability to cause destruction but in the certainty that it cannot be avoided if
they are used. Conventional warfare is also so horrific that opponents of
deterrence have never convinced society that retaining nuclear weapons
is a greater evil than running the risks of renouncing them. As conflicts
erupt without warning, the end of the Cold War does not justify unilateralism.
A strategic nuclear deterrent, like conventional Armed Forces in peacetime,
is an essential insurance policy against unpredictable dangers. A
successor to Trident will not breach the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it is
right to apply different standards to dictatorships and democracies where
nuclear weapons are concerned. Most of the current arguments about the
British deterrent, including its degree of independence from the United
States, were debated in depth in the early 1960s when the V-Bombers were
scheduled for replacement by Polaris. The Chiefs of Staff, under Lord
Mountbatten, were adamant that the safety of the country and its freedom
of action would be seriously undermined without an independently
controlled strategic deterrent. This view remains sound, irrespective of the
demise of the Soviet Union. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence Studies Vol. 8, No.Sep 2008: p262-285 |
| Journal Source | Defence Studies Vol. 8, No.Sep 2008: p262-285 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Deterrence ; Conventional Warfare |