| ID | 083230 |
| Title Proper | Predatory behavior of governments |
| Other Title Information | the case of mass killing |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bae, Sang Hoo ; Ott, Attiat F |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In this paper we seek to answer the question: why do governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three-stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for a mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816-1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle-related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 19, No.2; Apr 2008: p107-125 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 19, No.2; Apr 2008: p107-125 |
| Key Words | Mass Killing ; Vertical Differentiation |