ID | 083680 |
Title Proper | National security and imperial defence |
Language | ENG |
Author | McKercher, B J C |
Publication | 2008. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | British grand strategy in the 1930s had two cardinal elements: security of the home islands and Imperial Defence. This article questions the view that Britain did not have a strategic commitment to the continent of Europe till late in the 1930s. It also provides an over-arching analysis of the two distinct but intertwined periods in the evolution of national strategy and Imperial defence in that decade: before 1930 till late 1937 built around the strategy of the balance of power; and from late-1937 till early 1939 built around the strategy of appeasement. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the high level debate within the British government over strategic issues without putting the domestic political situation into the context of the impact of the First World War on Britain's society and economy. Similarly, the development of the new international order created at the Paris Peace Conference - and its demise in the 'hinge years' of the early 1930s - also needs to be better understood in terms of how British grand strategy emerged in this period. A rational and realistic policy, appeasement was a tactical diplomatic manoeuvre; it had no place serving as the strategic basis of British external policy. |
`In' analytical Note | Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 19, No.3; Sep 2008: p391-442 |
Journal Source | Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 19, No.3; Sep 2008: p391-442 |
Key Words | National Security ; Grand Strategy ; Great Britain |