| ID | 083746 |
| Title Proper | Economic interests and congressional voting on security issues |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Fordham, Benjamin O |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Most research on congressional consideration of foreign and defense policy concludes that ideology is the most important influence on roll-call voting and that constituent economic interests are not very important. This article challenges this conclusion on two grounds. First, most previous research conceives of constituent economic interests on these issues very narrowly, examining only the benefits constituents obtain from providing military goods and services rather than their economic stakes in the broader goals of national security policy. Second, the effect of ideology on congressional voting has changed enormously over time, a fact that poses difficulties for research that has stressed this consideration. The effects of broader economic interests and the changing implications of ideology are tested using a sample of key Senate votes on military resource allocation, intervention, and foreign aid from 1947 through 2000. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 52, No.5; oct 2008: p623-640 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 52, No.5; oct 2008: p623-640 |
| Key Words | Congress ; Roll-Call Voting ; United States ; National Security Policy ; Economic Interests ; Ideology |