| ID | 084547 |
| Title Proper | Defensive counterterrorism measures and domestic politics |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Siqueira, Kevin ; Sandler, Todd |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Unlike most of the literature, this paper includes domestic political considerations in which two countries must decide defensive countermeasures against a common terrorist threat. A delegation problem arises as voters strategically choose a policymaker whose preferences differ from their own. As a consequence, countries limit the presumed oversupply of defensive countermeasures. Thus, the inclusion of domestic politics gives a new perspective on counterterrorism. The timing of elections is also shown to make a difference. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 19, No. 6; Sep 2008: p405-413 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 19, No. 6; Sep 2008: p405-413 |
| Key Words | Terrorism ; Externalities ; Counterterrorism ; Delegation Problem ; Domestic Politics |