| ID | 086333 |
| Title Proper | Anbar awakening |
| Other Title Information | alliance of incentives |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | McCary, John A |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The now-deceased leader of the Anbar Awakening, Sheikh Abd al Sittar Abu Reesha, once said, "Our American friends had not understood us when they came. They were proud, stubborn people and so were we. They worked with the opportunists, now they have turned to the tribes, and this is as it should be."1
Until 2007, the most violent region of insurgent attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq had been al Anbar, the largely rural, expansive western province stretching from the outskirts of Baghdad to Iraq's lengthy, mostly unsecured desert borders with Sunni-dominated Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.2 In what is most easily described as a marriage of convenience, Sunni insurgents and foreign Sunni al Qaeda fighters in al Anbar had formed a strategic and tactical alliance against what was perceived as an occupation by the United States or, more pointedly, against the occupation of a Muslim land by a largely Christian force, a deep affront to traditional Muslim values harkening back to the Crusades of the Middle Ages.3 Iraqis in al Anbar provided local knowledge, logistics, and up to 95 percent of the personnel, while experienced foreign al Qaeda fighters provided training, expertise, and financing. The pitch was simple: "We are Sunni. You are Sunni. The Americans and Iranians are helping the Shi'a - let's fight them together." |
| `In' analytical Note | Washington Quarterly Vol. 32, No.1; Jan 2009: p.43 - 59 |
| Journal Source | Washington Quarterly Vol. 32, No.1; Jan 2009 |
| Key Words | Anbar Awakening ; Alliance of Incentives ; American ; Al Qaeda ; United States ; Tribal Leaders ; Jordan ; Saudi Arabia ; Syria |