| ID | 088079 |
| Title Proper | Deliberative equality and the transgovernmental politics of the global financial architecture |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Baker, Andrew |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Revisiting the concept of transgovernmentalism, originally developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, can shed considerable light on the nature of interstate cooperation in contemporary global financial governance. Transgovernmentalism highlights how certain technocratic policy communities, composed of finance ministries, central banks, and regulators, dominate the global financial architecture. It also provides insights into the political and social basis of these actors' interactions and deliberations. Most importantly, renovating the concept of transgovernmentalism brings the participatory deficits in the current global financial architecture into sharp focus and points us in the direction of a workable reform agenda that would expand inclusion and participation. This article advocates basing future reform on efforts to achieve a closer realization of the principle of "deliberative equality." Unfortunately, "transgovernmentalism" is incompatible with deliberative equality, meaning that it is precisely the transgovernmental characteristics of the current global financial architecture that have to be challenged and overturned if we are to arrive at anything approximating deliberative equality. |
| `In' analytical Note | Global Governance Vol. 15, No. 2; Apr/jun 2009: p195-218 |
| Journal Source | Global Governance Vol. 15, No. 2; Apr/jun 2009: p195-218 |
| Key Words | Global Financial Architecture ; Transgovernmental Politics ; G7 ; G-20 ; Deliberation |