| ID | 088420 |
| Title Proper | Final Showdown |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hussain, Talat |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It is unwise to put deadlines on military campaigns against hardened hoodlums, especially if they are heavily funded, marvelously trained in guerilla warfare, and what is more, are driven by a fanatical sense of religious commitment to the cause of mayhem and murder.
It was not surprising therefore, that Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani's three-month time frame for completing the operations in Malakand had many under his command wondering whether it was a realistic goal. The problem, according to one commander who was part of the lengthy debate about the operational side of the military campaign, was not about the capability of the army to do the job. He claims that everyone agreed that the militants shall be eventually crushed and their command structure destroyed. The kernel of concern was that the army chief was unyielding on the 90-day limit and expected the entire area to be completely "sanitised" of the presence of the militants by then. |
| `In' analytical Note | Newsline Vol. 21, No.12; Jun 2009: p16-23 |
| Journal Source | Newsline Vol. 21, No.12; Jun 2009: p16-23 |
| Key Words | Final Showdown ; Operation Rah-e-Haq 4 ; Military Campaigns Against Hardened Hoodlums |