| ID | 090362 |
| Title Proper | International criminal bodies |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gould, Harry D |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | One of the insights of Constructivism is that our world is, in part, made by what we say about it. We make things what they are by saying what they are. One way is through the use of metaphor; by asserting that one thing is another thing. Does our saying that a state is a person make it a person?
A way to intervene in this discussion is by addressing it not in the abstract, but guided by a cognate question: Can states commit crimes, a uniquely human act? If states can commit and be liable for crimes, they must be able to form intents. If they are indeed persons in the relevant sense, this is no problem; if their personality is trope, however, attribution of criminal responsibility becomes tenuous.
To analyse the issue, I trace the development of the trope of speaking of a group as if it were an individual from Roman Law, through to Hobbes, corporate law and IR Theory. Much hinges on Hobbes' elision of 'body' and 'person'. I conclude that it is too much to expect of a metaphor that it act, that it have reasons, beliefs, and desires, and that these sum to intentions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Review of International Studies Vol. 35, No. 3; Jul 2009: p.701-721 |
| Journal Source | Review of International Studies Vol. 35, No. 3; Jul 2009: p.701-721 |
| Key Words | International Criminal Bodies ; Crime ; Criminal |