| ID | 090667 |
| Title Proper | A sea of confusion |
| Other Title Information | the mediterranean and detente, 1969-1974 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Pedaliu, Effie G H |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | From the beginning of the Cold War, the Mediterranean had emerged as one of the key theaters of confrontation between the United States and the USSR. However, the Cold War was to be just one of the many factors that fed this precarious regional security environment. As British power in the Mediterranean began to contract after 1945, the United States initially reluctantly, but inevitably, moved to fill this power vacuum through the Truman Doctrine, the inclusion into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of initially, France and Italy and later Greece and Turkey and the cultivation of an understanding with General Franco. Attempts were made to create closer relations with moderate Arab regimes through the Eisenhower Doctrine. During the 1950s, the Mediterranean became a sea of American preponderance where, ostensibly, most local sources of discord had been subsumed into the greater global conflict. |
| `In' analytical Note | Diplomatic History Vol. 33, No. 4; Sep 2009: p735-750 |
| Journal Source | Diplomatic History Vol. 33, No. 4; Sep 2009: p735-750 |
| Key Words | United States ; Detente ; USSR |