| ID | 091063 |
| Title Proper | Al Qaeda, deterrence, and weapons of mass destruction |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Stone, John |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article takes issue with the frequently-made assertion that Al Qaeda cannot be deterred from employing weapons of mass destruction. It argues that Al Qaeda's leadership employs terroristic violence in a manner calculated to achieve a set of political goals. They are, in other words, rational actors who are sensitive to the potential costs and benefits associated with their actions, and thus are to some extent deterrable. The article examines a number of ways in which the lack of discrimination and proportionality associated with weapons of mass destruction might be expected to produce more problems than benefits for Al Qaeda and thus deter their use. It also considers some ways in which the West might seek to bolster these deterrent effects. |
| `In' analytical Note | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 32, No. 9; Sep 2009: p.763 - 775 |
| Journal Source | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 32, No. 9; Sep 2009: p.763 - 775 |
| Key Words | Al Qaeda ; Deterrence ; Weapons ; Mass Destruction ; Terrorism ; Political Goals |