| ID | 091670 |
| Title Proper | Cooperation, signals, and sanctions |
| Other Title Information | gaming the nuclear inspection regime |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Helfstein, Scott |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 16, No. 3; Nov 2009: p385-405 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 16, No. 3; Nov 2009: p385-405 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Inspections ; Sanctions ; Nonproliferation Regime ; Nuclear Weapons ; Game Theory |