| ID | 091748 |
| Title Proper | National assessment by the national security council staff 1968-80 |
| Other Title Information | an American experiment in a British style of analysis? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Marrin, Stephen ; Davies, Philip H J |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | At a time of intense debate over the specific organizational arrangements of American national security agencies with new or refocused intelligence responsibilities, the relative proximity between intelligence producers and consumers is a key issue. Intelligence capabilities may have to be kept separate from decision-making because of organizational economies of scale and scope, but separation alone does not mean intelligence must be distant from decision-making. For example, the British style of analysis involves a much closer relationship between intelligence producers and consumers than exists in the American context. Efforts to improve the integration of intelligence into decision-making by closing the distance between them would do well to study the history and efficacy of this process as they look to create new ways of structuring the relationship between intelligence analysis and decision-making. Specifically, history demonstrates that the US National Security Council staff implemented a process in 1968 through 1980 that approximated the British style of analysis, and this may provide US policymakers with a model for bridging the gap between intelligence analysis and decision-making. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 24, No. 5; Oct 2009: p.644 - 673 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 24, No. 5; Oct 2009: p.644 - 673 |
| Key Words | National Assessment ; National Security Council Staff - 1968-80 ; American Experiment ; American National Security ; United States ; United Kingdom |