| ID | 091779 |
| Title Proper | Britain and Hiroshima |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hymans, Jacques E C |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 32, No. 5; Oct 2009: p769-796 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 32, No. 5; Oct 2009: p769-796 |
| Key Words | Great Britain ; World War II ; Atomic Bombings - Japan ; International Control - Nuclear Weapons |